Dan C. Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department & Ogden City, A Utah Municipal Corporation : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Dan C. Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department &
Ogden City, A Utah Municipal Corporation : Brief
of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.John T. Caine; Attorneys for AppellantsTimothy W. Blackburn;
Attorney for Respondents
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Worrall v. Ogden Fire Dept, No. 16375 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1685
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAN C. WORRALL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY FIRE 
DEPARTMENT & OGDEN 
CITY, A Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16375 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from a judgment of no cause of action against 
the plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court, County 
of Weber, State of Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
presiding. 
JOHN T. CAINE of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 393-5367 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
Assistant Corporation Counsel 
Attorney for Respondents 
P. 0. Box 9699 
Ogden, UT 84409 
Telephone: (801) 399-8245 
F ! LED 
AUG 1~1979 
....,.__ .. -----------------------------------
Clerk. Supreme Cou.t. Utah Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WORRALL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs 
1f~T 1 tn CITY FIRE 
1 1f: µynrnNT & OGDEN 
CIT\'., A Utah Municipal 
r:orporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16375 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from a judgment of no cause of action against 
the plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court, CoWlty 
of Weber, State of Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
presiding. 
.1n1-11; T CAINE of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
~I rr,ineys for Appellant 
1
•;R Washington Boulevard 
tJ:'.·ie11, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 393-5367 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
Assistant Corporation CoWlsel 
Attorney for Respondents 
P 0. Box 9699 
GgJen, UT 84409 
Telephone: (801) 399-8245 
J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
NOT PROPERLY APPEALED TO THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL 
SERVICE COMMISSION WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE 
TIME AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
1 
NEW TRIAL WAS CORRECT ............. 4 
POINT II 
GENERAL RULE NO. 160 WAS NOT ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
DENYING HIM EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 8 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . 9 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED Page 
Vetterli v. Civil Service Co!Illilission of Salt Lake City, 
145 P. 2d 792 (Utah) (1946) . . . . . . . 4 
Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 287 P.2d 670 (1955) ..... 5,6 
Rose Marie Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 
No. 15634, filed January lo, 1979. . . . . . . 7 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 10-10-21, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 5,9 
ii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAN C . WORRALL , 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY FIRE 
DEPARTMENT & OGDEN 
CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
Case No 16375 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents take issue with the following facts as stated 
by appellant. 
Fact as stated by appellant: 
Evidence was further produced by other firemen indicating 
that there were no health or safety problems with the wearing of 
a mustache, (T-24,T-33), although some individuals felt there could 
be a problem with the sealing of face masks in fighting a fire 
with certain facial hair, and that was the reason for the promulgation 
of the rule (T-33). 
Chief Hansen testified that the extreme heat or exposure to 
a flash fire can burn exposed skin, hair or the like causing injury 
(T-45-46). He also testified that through his research he found that 
beards and sideburns can cause the protective oxygen mask not to 
seal properly. (T-45). 
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The Assistant Chief Hilton testified that masks cannot se 
properly when hair gets in the way as seepage will occur. (T-53) 
He further testified that hair burns and that was a facto: 
they considred in adopting General Order 160. (T-53). 
Fact as stated by appellant: 
Evidence was also adduced that indicated that other in-
dividuals were also in violation of Rule 160, but were not discipl: 
as was the appellant. (T-10-T-27-T-33). 
Fact as stated by respondent: 
Chief Hansen testified as follows: 
Q. Now, after you issued Order No. 160, did you have a 
conversation with the plaintiff, Mr. Dan Worrall, concerning the 
order, Chief Hansen: 
A. Yes, Mr. Worrall was accosted in the outer office or 
hallway the day that he came onto the shift. He stated or demandl 
did I, in fact, intend to enforce this order. 
Q. What was your response: 
A. I said, "Dan yes, I do. I intend to enforce any ore! 
that I issue in regard to this Fire Department." And he stated, 
"well, I intend to fight you because I have no intentions of cutt, 
off this mustache." 
Q. Okay. What occurred after that confrontation? 
A. " at that particular time no action was taken. 
I discussed it with his supervisor which was mentioned before 
Lawrence Todd. We talked about it again. I had Dan into my off: 
later that oay or the next shift. I am not really sure now. We 
-2-
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talked about it and discussed the matter, and he said he wanted to 
think about it a little more at that time, and we did. Shortly 
thereafter, there was no compliance again to the order. I directed 
a letter to the city manager and to all concerned at the particular 
time that Mr. Worrall be suspended, only that suspension be not in 
effect and in fact enforced, that I give him some time to think about 
it, that we wanted to work on it. Like I say, I don't take no 
exception with Danny's work ability and that. I give him every 
opportunity possible to comply with the order, and each step no 
compliance was felt. " 
Q. What was the reason why he was terminated, then? 
A. He was terminated for failure to compliance--for 
compliance with this order which is correctly called insubordination, 
whatever the fact that he did not comply. He refused to comply. 
And he did not. (T-46-47) 
Q. . What is the procrdure the Fire Department goes 
through to bring people into conformity with Order No. 160? 
A. . As has been brought out in here before, people have 
been approached and told that they should straighten up, they 
should cut mustaches, and in most cases that is all it takes to 
do it. They have shaving facilities, bathroom facilities, and the 
like, and in general, it is just taken care of immediately, right 
then, without any quibbling or the like. 
Q. Now, do you know of any other individuals besides Mr. 
Worrall that have not, when requested to get a haircut or trim a 
mustache or a beard--or not beard, but sideburns, that have not 
done it? (T-48) 
-3-
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A. No. I do not know. They have been requested and 
they have complied. (T-48) 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
NOT PROPERLY APPEALED TO THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL 
SERVICE COMMISSION WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE TIME 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
WAS CORRECT. 
Appellant cites Vetterli vs. Civil Service Commission of 
Salt Lake City, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah) (1946) as authority for his 
position that the Civil Service Commission may review an appeal 
that is not filed within five (5) days. The Court in Vetterli, 
however, declined to discuss the issue that his appeal was not f:1 
in time. The language from Vetterli reads as follows: 
"Owing to the fact that the Chief of Police 
and the Civil Service Commission desire to have 
the statute involved in this case construed by 
the Court and in view of the conclusion reached 
as to its meaning, we shall not discuss either 
(a) the proposition that the appeal was not in 
time. . . . " (Emphasis added) See 145 P. 2d at 794 
Vetterli is not authority for the position that the Civ 
Service Commission may review appeals untimely filed. 
The reason Vetterli came before the Supreme Court is bee! 
all parties involved "desired to have the statute involved int' 
case construed by this court." See 145 P.2d at 794 
Plaintiff is correct that an objection was made by the· 
chief that Vetterli' s appeal had not been perfected within the .I 
allowed by law and that the commission overruled that objectior, 
and heard the matter. However, we do know upon what facts the 
Civil Service Commission overruled the police chief, it could" 
been the same reason the Supreme Court gave in declining to ru. 
-4-
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on the five day appeal period; that is the importance of determining 
the scope of Civil Service Corrrrnission authority. 
We agree that the notices appellant received did not tell 
him that he had five days to appeal. However, we do not agree 
that some vague reference was made during the course of the trial, 
that the five day appeal provision is contained within a handbook 
of rules and regulations passed out to all employees by the 
department. The appellant was given, as is all employees, a 
handbook that specifically explains the procedure and time limits 
involved when appealing termination. It is not vague, but is 
specific. Also, Section 10-10-21 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
spells out the time limits to file an appeal. 
Appellant's argument is: I was not aware of the time period 
to file an appeal, therefore, do not penalize me for not filing 
within the required time. Appellant is not trying to justify the 
tardy appeal on any other grounds. There is little question that 
he should have known the time period to file an appeal. The law 
charges everyone with a knowledge of published statutes, and because 
this information was available, and in fact the appellant should have 
known the time requirements, this Court should not allow his ignorance 
to allow him a hearing before the Industrial Collllllission. 
I agree with appellant's analysis of Entre Nous Club 
v. Toronto, 287 P.2d 670 (1955), that appellant is entitled to a 
reasonable time and place for hearing where interested parties may 
attend with reasonable effort; ... reasonable notice to interested 
-5-
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parties ... ; and a reasonable opportunity for presentation 
of such evidence and argument as are appropriate to the proceea,: 
However, the notice the Court is referring to is the Mt 
-.:. 
of the hearing, not notice that the appellant should be notifiec 
of the time limit in which to file an appeal. 
The facts of Toronto are the Secretary of State was sue( 
Entre Nous Club to restrain the Secretary of State from revokini 
their charter. 
The Secretary of State was proceeding to revoke their 
charter pursuant to a statute that authorized the Secretary of 
State, after a hearing, to revoke the charter of any non-profit, 
club if it was actually organized for pecuniary profit, or is 
used for gambling or other unlawful purposes. 
The Secretary of State had given notice of the hearing, 
but the notice as issued was not notice "which we could general: 
characterize as reasonably calculated to give actual notice" 
and was not given to the club as required by the statute. 
As the Court can plainly determine, the facts of~ 
are not even similar to the facts before this Court, and the nq 
requirement that is spoke of is the notice involved in notifyir.: 
the corporation of the hearing for revocation, not the time in 
which to file an appeal. Due process of law does not require t' 
City to notify the appellant of the time period in which to fii 
an appeal contesting termination. I agree, due process would 
require the City to notify the appellant of any hearings that c, 
with his termination. 
-6-
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I agree with appellant that there are administrative 
agencies that send notice of the time period in which to appeal; 
however, it is not a procedure mandatory by law. In this type 
case it is not mandatory that the city notify the appellant that he 
has five days to appeal upon termination. As stated previously, 
appellant was notified of his right to appeal by receiving a copy 
of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations when he commenced his 
employment. Also, not only appellant but every civil service employee 
is put on notice of their right to appeal by Section 10-10-21 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). There is no legal duty for the City 
to notify the appellant of the time to appeal upon termination. 
Respondents agree with appellant's interpretation of Rose 
Marie Hurne v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, No. 15634, filed 
January 10,1979, in that the appeal period runs from notice of 
judgment. Applying the facts of Rose Marie Hurne to the facts of 
this case, appellant should have been notified that he was terminated, 
and there is little question he was notified of the fact. Rose 
Marie Hurne is not authority for appellant's position that the City 
must notify the appellant of the appeal period. 
Respondents did try to use the five day appeal period 
in their motion for sununary judgment to prevent the Court from 
hearing the case on its merits. However, the trial court ruled 
that respondents' motion was not timely filed and proceeded to the 
merits of the case. As respondents read the Order and Judgment, 
the Court is saying "if the motion for sununary judgment was timely 
filed, the Court would have ruled the appellant had not exhausted 
-7-
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his administrative remedies and granted the motion; however, 
because it was not timely filed the Court heard the facts and 
held the facts were not sufficient to carry appellant's burden:: 
proof. 
As this Court can plainly determine, there was not any 
evidence presented that would demonstrate Order No. 160 had no 
rational, reasonable relationship to a bona fide public purp05, 
The district court was correct in ruling that there was not caus, 
of action against the City. 
Appellant had an effective review of the merits, by the 
district court hearing the case. 
POINT II. 
GENERAL RULE NO. 160 WAS NOT ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
DENYING HIM EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW GUAR-
ANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant in his complaint alleged that "administering 
the regulation in question was a denial of equality of rights <: 
was arbitrary and capricious, thereby denying him due process a: 
equal protection under the law contrary to the Fourteenth Amend 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Appellant's allegatc: 
were not that the fire department actions were arbitrary and 
capricious against the appellant, but rather General Order No.· 
denied appellant Is rights guaranteed by the United States and n 
Constitutions. Appellant tried to receive a new trial on issue· 
that were not alleged in his complaint and not properly before·. 
Court. The Court did, however, receive testimony that other 
firemen were called in and requested to bring their hair, si~' 
and mustaches in conformity with the order and they complied. 
-8-
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Assistant Chief Hilton testified that to keep grooming standards in 
conformity to General Order No. 160 is an ongoing process and men 
tPn~ tn let their hair grow beyond the requirements; however, when 
requested they get a trim and meet the requirement of the Order. 
I agree that the appellant was singled out, but why was he 
singled out? That question is easily answered from the evidence; 
the appellant wanted to challenge General Order No. 160. The 
method by which he chose to challenge the order was by non-compliance. 
There can be no arbitrary and capricious application of Order 160 
when the appellant is given the same opportunity as the other 
firemen but he refuses to comply. The record is repleat, and there 
is a specific finding that appellant realized his mustache did not 
comply and he was officially challenging the validity of the 
department's action in issuing Order No. 160. 
I also agree that the appellant was an excellent employee; 
but I disagree that he was "made an example." There is no evidence 
to support that allegation; on the contrary, all the evidence 
supports the findings of the Court that he was given an opportunity 
to comply but refused because "he was challenging the validity 
of the Order." There can be no violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under the facts before this 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was notified of his right to appeal his 
termination within five (5) days by Section 10-10-21, Utah Code 
-9-
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L 
Annotated (1953). Also, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations 
he received upon being employed by the City notified him of the. 
period to appeal termination. 
There is no duty on the part of the respondents to noti: 
the appellant at the time of his termination that he has five G 
to appeal said termination. 
The appellant challenged the validity of General Order:; 
160 by not trirmning his mustache as requested. Appellant tooka 
chance and lost the challenge. He allowed his personal preferer. 
to appearance take precedence over his employment. There is 
nothing wrong with that decision if you are prepared to face th1 
consequences. There is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendmen: 
equal protection, under these facts. 
The trial court did not make any errors that have 
prejudiced the rights of the appellant, and its decision should 
be upheld by this Court. 
DATED this ~day of August, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted 
Counsel 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
